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Civil Resistance and the
Corruption-Violence Nexus
SHAAZKA BEYERLE
International Center on Nonviolent Conflict
There are multiple ways in which corruption is linked to violent
conflict, some direct and some indirect. For ordinary citizens, the
experience of this nexus is the denial of basic freedoms and rights. In
spite of such bleak circumstances, people can move from being vic-
tims and bystanders to becoming a force for transforming their so-
cieties. Citizens are engaging in civil resistance to curb corruption
and win accountability and justice. This article: explores the link-
ages between corruption and violence; identifies the conceptual and
practical limitations of top-down, technical approaches to combat-
ing corruption; articulates a bottom-up approach in which the civic
realm is included in the anti-corruption equation; and presents case
studies of civic action campaigns and movements under conditions
of violence, post-conflict transformation or state capture by violent
crime syndicates. From these, general lessons learned are distilled.
Key words: corruption, civil resistance, civic action, nonviolent,
people power, accountability, citizen, post-conflict transformation,
violent conflict
Corruption is intimately linked to violent conflict, human
insecurity, and oppression. In a checklist of the "root causes
of conflict and early warning indicators," the European
Commission (2008) includes the corruption troika of bribery
in bureaucracies, collusion between the private sector and civil
servants, and organized crime. At an aggregate level, corrup-
tion has been found to be positively correlated with higher
risks of political instability (Le Billon, 2003). Human Rights
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Watch (2007) cites a direct relationship between corruption
and political violence, in which state officials use stolen public
revenues to pay for violence in support of their political am-
bitions. A 2004 report of the Secretary General's High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change states that "corrup-
tion, illicit trade and money-laundering contribute to State
weakness, impede economic growth and undermine democ-
racy. These activities thus create a permissive environment for
civil conflict" (United Nations, 2004, p. 20). Finally, corruption
also creates an overall climate of impunity (Kaufmann, 2006).
Human rights organizations link corruption to repression, as
it impedes government accountability, and can motivate offi-
cials and security forces to commit abuses for financial or other
forms of gain (Ganesan, 2007).
There are multiple ways in which corruption is linked to
violent conflict, some direct and some indirect. War economies
by their nature function through malfeasance; the parties in
the conflict depend on fraud, bribery, and criminal groups to
expedite the smooth functioning of the system (Scharbatke-
Church & Reiling, 2009). Arms traffickers and trans-national
organized crime add to the deadly mix by readily providing
weapons. The global illicit arms trade is estimated at $200-$300
million annually and Africa is the largest so-called market. As
a result, the continent tragically suffers the most casualties
from it (United Nations News Centre, 2010).
Moreover, corruption can draw out or perpetuate bloody
confrontations. Violent groups themselves engage in illicit ac-
tivities to acquire weapons and supplies. According to a confi-
dential source, Al Qaeda has access to emeralds mined in the
Northern Frontier province of Pakistan, from which it has been
deriving approximately $150 million income per year. Nowhere
is this process more wrenchingly evident than in DR Congo,
where approximately 3.5 million lives have been lost since
the onset of war in 1998 and hundreds of thousands of girls
and women have been systematically raped (Global Witness,
2004; UNICEF, 2008). The military, rebel groups, and various
foreign allies have plundered the country's diamonds, gold,
timber, ivory, coltan and cobalt, not only to finance their atroci-
ties but ultimately to enrich themselves, which has become an
end unto itself (Global Witness, 2004). Over the past decade,
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violent confrontations over the Casamance region have broken
out among Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Senegal, and between
Cameroon and Nigeria in the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula for an
equal length of time. A USAID report concluded that corrup-
tion, more often than not, played a key role in fomenting and
protracting these conflicts (USAID, 2007).
When corruption is endemic, whereby a complex system
of graft permeates the political system, economic spheres, and
basic provision of services in a country, it can stimulate social
unrest and foment violent conflict. For example, in the Niger
Delta, insurgent groups are amassing weapons and recruit-
ing young men from an impoverished, angry and frustrated
population that experiences little benefit from oil wealth while
living amidst horrendous environmental degradation from
its extraction and processing (United Nations Development
Program, 2006).
In the post-conflict context, corruption can function as an
inhibitor of sustainable peace, the latter needing human se-
curity and stability to take root and flourish (Ahtisaari, 2009).
First, graft can allow the entrenchment of the political status
quo that operated during the conflict (Le Billon, 2007). Second,
it undermines the new government's legitimacy, rule of law,
and capacity for reconstruction, economic development and
the provision of basic public services. For ordinary citizens, the
horrors of war are replaced with grueling hardship, to which
pervasive malfeasance adds another layer of tangible injustice,
such as in Afghanistan. In a 2010 poll, 83 percent of Afghans
said corruption affects their daily lives (United States Embassy
Kabul, 2010). As a result, the Taliban is recruiting new members
from among the marginalized population oppressed by unre-
lenting graft and poverty.
Corruption can be an enabler of state-capture in post-con-
flict or fragile democracies. Tragically on the rise in Central
America, "narco-corruption" refers to the interrelationship
between transnational drug cartels and state security forces,
as well as the infiltration of organized crime interests into
politics, governance and the actual functioning of institutions,
leading to countries such as Mexico and Guatemala being
called narco-states. In the first 2.5 years of Mexican President
Felipe Calderon's administration, drug violence took 12,000
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lives (Camp, 2009). The United Nation's Office of Drugs and
Crime chief has asserted, "Corruption, poverty and poor crim-
inal justice capacity make Guatemala extremely vulnerable to
organized crime" (United Nations Office of Drugs & Crime,
2010). Not coincidentally, the country is experiencing the
worst violence since the cessation of the 36-year civil war in
1996. Approximately 5,000 people are murdered each year due
to organized crime and gangs, now compounded by Mexican
drug-cartels expanding south across the border (Dudley, 2010;
Sanchez, 2007). Narco-corruption, of course, is not limited to
the Americas. The drug trade in Afghanistan also serves as the
main source of financing for the private armies of local war-
lords, which are connected to parts of the post-conflict gov-
ernment (Confidential communication, 2009). The Taliban is in
on the game as well, exchanging drugs for weapons (Starkey,
2008).
A vicious cycle can develop, whereby authoritarian and/or
ineffectual governance paired with endemic corruption results
in the further de-legitimization of authority and rule of law,
leading to fragmented tyrannies, which in turn reinforces au-
thoritarian and/or ineffectual governance, impunity, poverty,
and so on. In contrast, civil resistance has the potential to ac-
tivate an anti-corruption cycle. Nonviolent social movements
and grass-roots civic campaigns can challenge the corruption-
violence nexus, which in turn create alternative loci of power,
thereby empowering the civic realm to continue to wage stra-
tegic civic campaigns and movements (Zunes, 2008). The civic
realm refers to the collective non-state, bottom-up initiatives
and relationships in a society. This includes: nonviolent civic
campaigns and movements; civil society organizations (CSOs);
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); community-based
organizations (CBOs); civic coalitions and alliances; unions;
professional organizations; grass-roots networks, committees,
and collectives; local citizen groups; activists, community or-
ganizers, and last but not least, citizens.
Echoing this dynamic, a Kenyan civic leader explained:
"If people are able to be encouraged to go out, today it's CDF
[Constituency Development Funds], tomorrow it's something
else, and another day it's another thing. So CDF is an entry
point to the realization of so many rights that people are not
getting" (International Budget Partnership, 2010). To target
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corruption is to simultaneously touch the myriad of injustices
to which it is linked, from violence and poverty, to impunity,
human rights abuses, authoritarianism, unaccountability, sub-
standard social services, and environmental destruction. Thus,
fighting graft is not a superficial solution that avoids the un-
derlying problem; it can be a direct attack on oppression.
Civil Resistance
Civil resistance expresses people power through the use
of nonviolent strategies and tactics. It is also called nonvio-
lent struggle and nonviolent conflict. "People power" refers to
political, social and economic pressure that is exerted by sig-
nificant numbers of people organized together around shared
grievances and goals.
The efficacy of civil resistance is not a matter of theory
(Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Nonviolent social movements
and civic campaigns have a rich history of ending oppression
and injustice and the apparatus of state and other forms of cor-
ruption. A 2008 study found that in the last century, violent
campaigns succeeded historically in only 26 percent of all
cases, compared to 53 percent in the case of nonviolent, civil-
ian-based campaigns (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). A quanti-
tative analysis of transitions from authoritarianism to democ-
racy over the past three decades found that civil resistance was
a key factor in driving 75% of political transitions, and such
transformations were far more likely to result in democratic
reform and civil liberties than violent or elite-led, top-down
changes. Of the 35 countries subsequently rated "Free" accord-
ing to a Freedom House index, 32 had a significant "bottom up"
civil resistance component (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2005).
Over the past twenty years, from the 1986 "People Power"
uprising in the Philippines to the "Color Revolutions" in the
former Soviet Union, corruption has been a source of deep
public discontent and a key mobilizing issue of nonviolent
social movements. This shows that people themselves, who
increasingly experience the nexus of violent conflict, crime and
corruption as another form of tyranny, can move from being
victims and bystanders to becoming a force for transforming
their societies.
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Reconceptualizing Corruption
The global anti-corruption arena is relatively new, having
emerged over the past two decades. While there certainly has
been progress, change has been modest (International Council
on Human Rights Policy, 2009). Wide-scale, national anti-cor-
ruption programs, favored by donor countries and multilateral
institutions, have had less than consistent results (Hussmann
& Hechler, 2008). Transparency International's 2010 Global
Corruption Barometer found that 60 percent of those surveyed
in 86 countries and territories said that corruption has increased
over the past three years. Eighty percent stated that political
parties are corrupt or extremely corrupt and half asserted that
their government's efforts to stop corruption were ineffective.
Since 2006, pay-offs to police are said to have doubled, while
more respondents reported paying bribes to the judiciary, and
for registry and permit services than in 2005. Poorer interview-
ees were twice as likely as more well-off individuals to pay
bribes for basic services.
Through the framework civil resistance and people power,
it's not surprising that a predominantly top-down approach has
limitations. One must start with the definition of corruption,
commonly characterized as "the misuse of entrusted power
for private gain," or the "abuse of public office for private
gain" (Transparency International, 2010). While concise and
accurate, conceptually they do not convey the systemic nature
of corruption, which involves a complex set of relationships,
some obvious and others hidden, with established vested in-
terests, that can cut across political, economic and social forces.
Moreover, how a problem is defined will affect how it is ad-
dressed. Thus, up until this decade, there was an over-empha-
sis on the state. Less attention was paid to other groups, such
as agricultural landowners, private sector, multinational cor-
porations, oligarchies, crime syndicates, gangs, and paramili-
taries, as well as their inter-relationships.
Second, the strategies have been top-down and elite-
driven, with a focus on developing norms, rules and structures
that mainly target administrative graft. According to a former
World Bank specialist, there is the fallacy that one "fights cor-
ruption by fighting corruption" (Kaufmann, 2005, p. 41). This
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has translated into a preponderance of international agree-
ments, policy diagnoses, legislation, and institution-building,
such as anti-corruption comnuissions, improvement of nation-
al and local government capacity, and public finance manage-
ment. The underlying assumption is that once anti-corruption
frameworks are put in place, illicit practices will change. But
how can institutional mechanisms bring forth change, when
they must be implemented by the very institutions that are
corrupt? Those who are benefitting from corruption are ex-
pected to be the ones to curb it. It's not surprising then, that
even when political will exists, it can be thwarted, because too
many people have a stake in the crooked status quo.
Lastly, traditional strategies have not appreciably factored
people into the equation-although they are the ones who bear
the brunt of corruption, have direct experience of it, suffer its
ill-effects, and can contribute to curbing it. For those on the
receiving end, the experience of corruption can be oppression
and a loss of freedom. Aruna Roy, one of the founders of the
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) "Right to Information"
movement in India, characterizes corruption as "the external
manifestation of the denial of a right, an entitlement, a wage,
a medicine..." (Roy, n.d.). Viewed from this perspective, the
priorities shift to controlling those forms of graft and abuse
that are most harmful or common to citizens, particularly the
poor. The goals are accountability, participatory democracy,
and social and economic justice.
The Dynamics of a Bottom-Up Approach to
Curbing Corruption
To its credit, there has been a growing recognition in the
international anti-corruption community and among donors
and development institutions, especially over the past six
years, that corruption cannot be challenged unless the civic
realm is involved, including an active citizenry. This para-
digm shift was encapsulated in the final statement of the 14 h
International Anti-Corruption Conference (2010), which stated:
"Empowered people create change ... This expanded element
of our conference points the way for the future of the anti-cor-
ruption movement, one incorporating citizen mobilization and
empowerment, as well as the inclusion of youth" (p. 7).
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Well-organized, strategic civic movements and campaigns
may be particularly suited to a systemic approach to curbing
corruption. First, mobilized people, engaged in organized
collective nonviolent action, constitute a social force that
can exert pressure on the state, as well as on other sectors in
society. Second, civil resistance can disrupt both vertical (up
and down within an institution) and horizontal (across in-
stitutions, groups, sectors) corruption. Third, civil resistance
has a strategic advantage, as it consists of extra-institutional
methods of action to push for change, when power holders are
corrupt and/or unaccountable, and institutional channels are
blocked or ineffective. This involves generating political will,
demanding specific measures, and reinforcing new patterns of
administration and governance centered on accountability to
citizens. Hence, top-down and bottom-up approaches are not
mutually exclusive. Civic campaigns and movements can com-
plement and reinforce legal and administrative mechanisms,
which constitute the anti-corruption infrastructure needed
for long-term transformation of systems of graft and abuse.
Finally, civil resistance can also support honest individuals,
within state institutions and other entities, who are attempting
reforms and change. All too often, lone figures cannot chal-
lenge or dismantle entrenched, multi-faceted systems of graft
and unaccountability. Such attempts have been compared to
the actions of political dissidents, who stand in singular defi-
ance before an entire undemocratic system and are easily sup-
pressed (Martin, Callaghan, & Fox, 1997). This was the fate of
John Githongo, a former Kenyan anti-corruption chief, who
fled the country in 2004 after threats to his life.
Civic campaigns and movements, by their nature, emerge
from the civic realm and include the participation of ordi-
nary people united around common grievances, goals and
demands. People power is generated through the sustained,
strategic application of a variety of nonviolent tactics that are
designed to:
* Strengthen citizen participation and campaign
capacity;
* Disrupt systems of corruption, including dishonest
relationships, illicit practices and the status quo;
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* Weaken the sources of support and control for
unaccountable and corrupt power holders; entities,
systems, and their enablers; and/or
* Win support of sectors, groups, institutions, andfeople over to the civic campaign or movement, thelatter including from the public and from within
corrupt systems, for example, political leaders and
honest officials.
Nonviolent tactics constitute the methods of civil resis-
tance. Scholars such as Gene Sharp have identified over 200
tactics, and most campaigns and movements create new ones.
Civic anti-corruption initiatives engage in varieties of:
* noncooperation, civil disobedience
* low-risk mass actions, displays of symbols
* street theatre, visual dramatizations and stunts
* songs, poetry, cultural expressions, humor
* civic "report cards" for political candidates
* citizen "report cards" for public services
* monitoring of officials, members of parliament,
institutions, budgets, spending and public services
* social audits and "face the people" forums
* social networking technologies (e.g., Facebook
organizing and petitioning, blogging, SMS
communication)
* education and training, youth recreation
* social and economic empowerment initiatives,
creation of parallel institutions
* anti-corruption pledges; citizen-sponsored anti-
corruption awards
* protests, petitions, vigils, marches, sit-ins, leafleting
* strikes, boycotts, and reverse boycotts (e.g.,
patronizing businesses that refuse to pay protection
money or bribes)
* nonviolent blockades, nonviolent accompaniment
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Civic Campaigns and Movements to Fight Corruption
Though not widely known, there has been a grass-roots,
bottom-up "eruption against corruption," to borrow a popular
slogan of the Fifth Pillar movement in India. The author has
been conducting a research project to document and distill
general lessons learned from civic campaigns and movements
to fight graft and abuse, demand accountability and win rights.
It is examining the skills, strategies, objectives and demands of
such civic initiatives, rather than the phenomenon of corrup-
tion itself. The focus is on what civic actors and citizens--or-
ganized together, exerting their collective power-are doing to
curb corruption as they themselves define and experience it.
Over 30 cases have been identified, of which 15 are being
documented and analyzed in depth. A number of common at-
tributes of civic campaigns and movements to fight corruption
are emerging from the case studies. Bottom-up initiatives can
be found around the world, among democracies, semi-democ-
racies and authoritarian regimes. Contrary to common mis-
conceptions that civic mobilization is only possible when there
is political space, a relatively educated populace and a non-
violent legacy, they are prevalent in societies enduring poor
governance, poverty, illiteracy, repression, and violence, the
latter two perpetrated by the state, organized crime, paramili-
tary groups and gangs. Rather than spontaneous outbursts,
organization and planning precede action, even when a scan-
dalous event first arouses public indignation. Taken together,
they confirm what some civil resistance scholars assert; skills
and strategy generally matter more than pre-existing condi-
tions (Ackerman, 2007).
Women and youth are also playing galvanizing roles in many
campaigns, notably in Muslim settings. "Defining methods,"
around which a host of nonviolent tactics revolve, are common
(Schock, 2010). Success in one struggle or context inspires new
applications, knowledge-sharing and campaigns-locally and
even across borders and continents. Finally, the struggles are
quite often multidimensional in focus, reflecting the reality
that corruption does not occur in a vacuum; it is linked to other
forms of oppression and injustice.
The following four cases have been chosen for their
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relevance to peace building and conflict transformation con-
texts and strategies.
Guatemala: Grass-Roots Resistance to Violence and Impunity
In Guatemala, innovative grass-roots civil resistance
movements have been undermining the corruption-violence
nexus at the community level, maintaining resilience in the
face of brutal repression, and fostering social and economic
development. One particularly poignant case is in Santa Lucia
Cotzumalguapa, a mid-size town populated largely by indig-
enous people, which suffered great losses during the civil war
(1960-96). It was the cradle of the organized peasant movement,
and the site of persecution and mass murder of peasants, church
members and unions by state forces, which was sponsored by
sugar plantation (Finca) owners. Every guerilla faction had a
presence as well. Dozens of the organized paramilitary groups
have since been transformed into hit-men operations, and it is
now unfortunately situated in a geographical spot convenient
to cross-border narco-trafficking, from Columbia up to Mexico
for the North American market (C. Samayoa, personal com-
munications, various dates, 2008-2010).
Reflecting a collective "outcry of despair," a local citizen's
movement emerged in the aftermath of the civil war. Its ob-
jectives were to recover the community and local government
from the hands of drug lords and organized crime, promote
economic and social development, create a collective sense of
worth and empowerment, challenge the climate of impunity,
prevent electoral fraud, and defend hard-won gains along the
way. Organizers put together a strong coalition that included
women, youth, and community groups. In spite of the legacy
of repression, they initially built alliances with Finca owners
(which later broke down) to support an honest candidate
in the local elections and kick out a drug lord from the local
government.
Over the years, they conducted a wide range of nonvio-
lent actions, such as: civil disobedience; solidarity demonstra-
tions; literacy, education and development programs; radio
call-in programs; theater; art festivals; and recreation projects
aimed at youth, who are often the targets of organized crime
recruitment. Their successes wrought severe counter-attacks.
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By 2007, 11 community leaders had been murdered, four at-
tempts were made on an honest mayor's life, slandering and
defamation cases were lodged, electoral fraud was orchestrat-
ed, and the police, prosecutors and judges favored the drug
cartels, an odious confirmation of the extent of corruption and
state capture.
In spite of this extreme intimidation, citizens refused to be
subdued. Solidarity demonstrations and civil disobedience per-
sisted. People engaged in new methods to disrupt the corrupt
status quo, such as monitoring the actions and spending of the
new authorities in power, as well as criminal activities, report-
ing the latter to the newly instituted International Commission
against Impunity in Guatemala, though it appears the case will
not be pursued. However, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights has accepted the case of the first assassination
that struck the town, which will proceed in 2011.
A significant dimension was added to the struggle-the
international community. Guatemalan human rights de-
fenders drew world attention to the movement. They gar-
nered support for civic initiatives from the United Nations
Development Program and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. A se-
curity plan was devised, bolstered by human rights organiza-
tions that networked to bring international observers and non-
violent accompaniment to protect people at risk. Santa Lucia
Cotzumalguapa became the host of national and international
meetings, thereby sending a message to the corrupt power
holders that the country and the world were watching and
stood together with the townspeople. Finally, home-grown,
grass-roots solidarity and coordination networks have been es-
tablished with other indigenous communities engaged in civil
resistance both in Guatemala and across borders. They share
information, experiences, and strategies, send out alerts, and
even have come to one another's aid, for example, by blocking
a road.
In extending the arena of resistance from the local to the
regional and international, the community is increasing its ca-
pacity of people power, the source being strength in numbers.
From unity within, they are building a broader front involving
allies at all levels. In confronting a system of violence, graft
and impunity involving the state and transnational organized
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crime, in essence, the citizens' movement is now creating an
alternative system of civil resistance, involving national and
transnational networking, solidarity and action. In seeking to
overcome marginalization and poverty through education and
development initiatives, for women and youth as well as the
town at large, the movement calls to mind Mohandas Gandhi's
"constructive programme in the nonviolent effort," (Gandhi,
1945) in which equality, education, and economic self-reli-
ance were core elements. Finally, the people of Santa Lucia
Cotzumalguapa embody what Gandhi observed decades ago,
"Strength does not come from physical capacity. It comes from
an indomitable will" (Gandhi, n.d.).
Indonesia: People Power Provides Protection
After 32 years of authoritarian rule and state violence
under General Suharto, the multi-ethnic Indonesia began
a new chapter of governance in 1999. Nonviolent civic co-
alitions played a significant role in his demise (Karatnycky
& Ackerman, 2005). The fledgling democracy inherited a
multitude of ills not unlike those of post-war contexts, from
widespread poverty to a 30-year armed conflict in Aceh that
resulted in close to 15,000 deaths (World Bank, 2005), dysfunc-
tional state institutions, security force impunity, and corrup-
tion, the latter embedded into the power structures and social
fabric of the country. Into this mix was born the Corruption
Eradication Commission (KPK) in 2003. When both the institu-
tion and leading figures in it were assailed, a nationwide civic
campaign came to its rescue, providing a rich example of how
civil resistance can protect government structures and honest
officials in fragile states.
While some anti-corruption commissions are dismissed
as "window-dressing" to satisfy donors and multilateral in-
stitutions, others are at the forefront of fighting corruption
and gaining transparency. The KPK has earned the public's
respect and admiration since it was created in 2003. It was
seen as the "hope to fix a broken country" (confidential source,
2010). KPK did not hesitate to confront the powers that be,
and expose corrupt behavior and relationships among the
local and national governments, Parliament, Administration,
private sector, and police, the latter having a particularly
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negative reputation with the public. It convicted politicians,
governors, judicial figures, and in 2008, the Deputy Governor
of the Central Bank, who is also the father-in-law of President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's son (Lindsey, 2009).
By threatening the entire tangled system of influence and
graft benefitting the ruling elites, KPK soon became a target.
Since early 2009, efforts to weaken, if not destroy, it have inten-
sified, including police criminalization of some of its activities,
the arrest of its Chairman for murder, investigations of deputy
commissioners, and parliamentary attempts to cut its budget
and authority. The situation came to a head mid-year, in the
wake of ongoing investigations of embezzlement in the infa-
mous Bank Century bailout, in which a wiretapped conversa-
tion documented the senior police officer handling the Century
case and a politically connected tycoon, Boedi Sampoema, dis-
cussing an arrangement to safely withdraw Rp 2 trillion de-
posited at the bank in return for a Rp 10 billion payoff.
By July 2009, a core group of civil society leaders-veter-
ans from the Reformasi civic movement against the former
Suharto regime-"saw the signs" (non-attributable activists,
2010). They decided it was necessary to proactively develop a
strategy to protect KPK-the institution, its mandate and au-
thority. One activist said, "We realized that what we faced was
so big and so strong and has so much authority, we needed
to come together." (non-attributable personal communication,
April, 2010). They launched the CICAK campaign, which had a
dual meaning. It's an acronym for "Love Indonesia, Love Anti-
Corruption," but it also refers to the gecko lizard. During the
Bank Century investigations, the Chief of the Police's criminal
department said that the KPK was like the gecko fighting the
crocodile. One hundred civic organizations joined, and a grad-
uate student on his own accord created a CICAK Facebook
group, which soon played a role bigger than anyone imagined.
CICAK groups formed in 20 of the country's 33 provinces and
well-known public figures came on board.
On October 29, the police arrested two KPK deputy
Chairmen, Chandra Hamzah and Bibit Samad Rianto, on
charges of abuse of power. The arrests came a day after
President Yudhoyono ordered an investigation into wiretapped
telephone conversations involving a senior Attorney General's
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Office official, in which the president was said to support
efforts to quell KPK. On October 30, the President gave a tele-
vised address stating he would let the police continue with the
case. People were furious with the police and embittered with
their leader, who had recently been re-elected on an anti-cor-
ruption platform. This repression backfired; CICAK was ready
to channel popular anger into civic mobilization. The Facebook
group grew so quickly that television news ran hourly updates
of the numbers, which reached 1.3 million and became a key
tool through which to communicate with and rally citizens.
CICAK organized actions in Jakarta, while local chapters and
high school and university students spontaneously initiated
events throughout the country.
Campaign tactics included demonstrations, marches to the
Presidential palace, petitions, wearing a black ribbon symbol-
izing the death of justice, gecko T-shirts, pins, stickers, leaflets,
banners reading "Say no to crocodiles," street murals, sit-ins,
gatherings in front of police stations, a hunger strike, street
theater, concerts, and "happening art" that often involved
humor and garnered national media coverage, for example,
jumping off the KPK building with parachutes. Popular singers
added their support and composed an anti-corruption song,
which people used for ringtones, with the refrains "gecko eats
crocodile," and "KPK in my chest." Citizens of all ages, socio-
economic groups, and religions participated. CICAK leaders
report that the upper middle and middle classes joined in
streets actions; professionals could be seen standing together
with students and poor people. Senior clerics of Indonesia's
five faiths paid solidarity visits to KPK.
CICAK demanded an immediate independent investiga-
tion and called on the President to save the KPK. As people
power escalated, he agreed to it, and the investigation began
soon after. Millions around the country heard a wire-tape in
which senior officials from the police and attorney general's
office and a big businessman planned to frame the KPK of-
ficials, including killing Chandra. The independent commis-
sion recommended the charges against the KPK officials be
dropped. Bibit and Chandra were released and went back to
work. Senior figures in the police and attorney general's office
resigned and other investigations have been launched. The
67
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CICAK campaign was the single largest social mobilization in
Indonesia since the Suharto dictatorship. Civic leaders remain
vigilant against new attacks on the KPK, but also exert pressure
on the KPK itself, in order to keep it clean and accountable.
Kenya: Overcoming Marginalization, Winning Accountability
Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) is a nongovern-
mental organization (NGO) based in Mombasa that operates
among impoverished communities in the area, which was a
site of political and ethnic violence in 1997 and after the 2008
elections. It is catalyzing grass-roots civic campaigns to access
information about budgets, curb corruption, win accountabil-
ity, and ultimately, fight poverty. It empowers poor communi-
ties in making their voices heard to their elected representatives
and local officials, thereby channeling frustration, hopeless-
ness and anger away from hostilities to changing unjust condi-
tions. The immediate focus is on the use, or rather, misuse of
constituency development funds (CDFs), which are annual al-
locations of approximately one million dollars to each Member
of Parliament for his/her district. MUHURI's long-term vision
is to cultivate a sense of agency among Kenyans (International
Budget Partnership, 2010; Ramkumar & Kidambi, 2010).
CDF is the result of a popular idea in the development
world; devolve power and give local communities resources
for their own development schemes. However, when there
is no meaningful independent oversight and corruption is
endemic, the end result is often mismanagement and graft.
For MUHURI, it's up to the people to provide the oversight.
Since 2007, the NGO has worked to animate and train citi-
zens in civic mobilization. Through a pioneering collabora-
tion with the International Budget Partnership and veteran
activists from the MKSS movement in India, it has developed
a defining nonviolent method-the five-step social audit. The
first step is information gathering-records from the local CDF
office. MUIHURI representatives are initially sent, because it's
daunting for ordinary citizens to approach officials and obtain
information. The second step is training local men and women
to become community activists. They learn how to decipher
documents and budgets, monitor expenditures and scrutinize
public works.
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The third step is inspecting the CDF project site. Newly
trained activists conduct systematic, meticulous documenta-
tion, comparing records to the reality on the ground. They also
use site visits to speak with local people, in order to gener-
ate interest in the social audit, get them to attend the public
hearing, and gather additional information about corruption
and abuse. The fourth step is educating and motivating fellow
citizens about the CDF and their right to information and ac-
countability. Community activists and MUHURI attract atten-
tion, directly engage people, and encourage them to attend
a "public hearing" through nonviolent tactics such as street
theater, puppet plays, trumpet and drum processions, and
leafleting by volunteers. Information about CDF misuse and
graft is shared and people's reactions and input are gathered.
The final step is the public hearing with CDF officials, the
media, and in some cases, the Member of Parliament. MUHURI
first leads a procession through the community, complete with
slogans, chanting and a youth band. It gathers dancing children
and adults as it goes along. Once the forum begins, local activ-
ists present the results of their investigations, CDF officials are
questioned, and citizens demand accountability of them. At
MUHURI's first ever public hearing in August 2007, approxi-
mately 1500-2000 residents in the Changamwe slum attended,
many standing for over four hours. The MP finally agreed to
register their complaints and charges against the concerned
contractors. MUHURI then rolled out a cloth banner petition
demanding that accountability and transparency measures be
added to the CDF Act and the RTI law be passed. The MP ini-
tially refused to sign it, but after all the people and opposi-
tion candidates signed it, he acquiesced to civic pressure and
added his name.
In 2009, whilst conducting the Likoni constituency social
audit, MUHURI's office was ransacked and their guard was
stabbed. The intimidation backfired. The next day a popular
radio station interviewed the Executive Director and a local
activist, which gave them another platform to communicate
with people and increase attendance at the public hearing.
That same year, activists from eight constituencies that con-
ducted social audits joined a national campaign, transcending
ethnic and social divisions, to change the CDF law. By June, the
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Kenyan government set up a task force to review it. MUHURI
is increasing its efforts to develop new campaigns (H. Khalid,
personal communication, November 12, 2010). For instance,
during the final week of October 2010, a social audit was con-
ducted in the Mwatate constituency. Earlier that month the
local public Chair and Secretary had been arrested and charged
in court for misappropriation of funds. The audit is investigat-
ing whether or not other project funds had been embezzled in
addition to those under scrutiny in the court case.
Turkey: Low-Risk Mass Actions Surmount Fear and Apathy
Public apathy and fear of reprisals from either the state or
vicious non-state actors are common among countries engulfed
in violent conflict or emerging from it. Nonviolent street actions,
such as protests, marches and sit-ins may, at least initially, be
too risky. As was the case in Santa Lucia Cotzumalguapa, this
did not mean that people were powerless. To the contrary, the
brilliance and creativity of ordinary citizens to disrupt systems
of malfeasance and impact the corruption-violence nexus is
staggering. The following case illustrates the force of civic
pressure from low-risk, mass actions.
In 1996, Turkey was plagued by a nationwide crime syn-
dicate that involved paramilitary entities, drug traffickers,
the mafia, businesses, government officials, members of par-
liament, and parts of the judiciary and media. Extra-judicial
killings were common, some linked to the mafia and some po-
litical in nature. That November a speeding car crashed on a
highway late at night near the town of Susurluk. Among the
passengers were a police chief and police academy director, a
member of parliament, and an escaped criminal and paramili-
tary member (wanted by the Turkish courts, Swiss police and
Interpol) who possessed a fake ID signed by the minister of
internal affairs. The car contained cash, cocaine, and weapons.
The following day students held unplanned protests through-
out the country, but were harshly repressed by police, while
other youth already on trial for previously breaking the "dem-
onstration law" were sentenced to 15 months in prison (Akay
& Mahoney, 2003; E. Salman, personal communication, June
24, 2010).
A small group of professionals, lawyers and civil society
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advocates decided that this scandal provided an opportu-
nity to tap public disgust, mobilize people to action, and
push for definable measures. Their demands were to remove
parliamentary immunity, prosecute the founders of the
criminal groups; protect judges trying such cases; and reveal
the crime syndicate relationships. They formed the Citizen
Initiative for Constant Light. From the outset, they made stra-
tegic choices-citizens should feel a sense of ownership in the
effort and the campaign would be apolitical-in order to build
a broad alliance, protect against smear attacks, and attract the
widest possible base of people. Prior to taking action they
defined goals, analyzed the media's views on corruption,
and developed a publicity strategy. Because the mafia had re-
cently been taking control of a major broadcasting corporation
through manipulating legislation and business links, the press
and National Broadcasters Association were looking for ways
to improve the media's image, and prior to the Susurluk crash,
had hired a PR expert to help them. Following the scandal, he
personally became involved in Citizen Initiative for Constant
Light.
The civic group systematically built a coalition by reach-
ing out to non-political entities, including the Istanbul
Coordination of Chambers of Professions, the Bar Association,
unions, nongovernmental organizations, and the professional
associations of pharmacists, dentists, civil engineers and elec-
trical engineers. The organizers sought to create an innovative
nonviolent action that would overcome real obstacles, such as
violent crackdowns, imprisonment, and public fear and feel-
ings of powerlessness. The teenage daughter of a lawyer in-
volved in the campaign came up with the idea of turning off
lights. A chain of mass faxes and press releases signed by "an
anonymous aunt," who became the image of the campaign,
got the word out.
On February 1, 1997, citizens began to turn off their lights
at 9:00 p.m. for one minute. After two weeks, approximately
30 million people participated throughout the country, adding
their own embellishments such as banging pots and pans and
staging street actions. Neighborhood squares took on a festive
character as people overcame their fear and gathered together.
The campaign lasted six weeks. In the short-term, it broke the
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strong taboo over confronting corruption. It empowered citi-
zens to fight corruption and forced the government to launch
judicial investigations. What was not anticipated was that the
military would remove its support for the government, which
was forced to resign. Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan re-
mained in power until a new government was approved by
the parliament six months later.
The next prime minister continued the court cases, handed
out verdicts, and set up an investigative committee, which pre-
pared a report listing the names of all people murdered by the
crime syndicate. A parliamentary committee was also created
to document the syndicate's activities. In 2001, the interior min-
ister launched a series of investigations. In cooperation with
the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, widespread
embezzlement was exposed, and well-known business execu-
tives were arrested. What was not achieved, one of the original
objectives, was the removal of parliamentary immunity, which
would have allowed an investigation of the Susurluk parlia-
mentarian. However, by 2003 most of old guard was voted out.
Analysts believe that voters punished both the political estab-
lishment and the military by electing the AK (White) Party, the
moderate Islamic party.
Lessons Learned
The case studies provide general lessons learned about
the application of civil resistance to curb corruption and win
accountability, rights and equity. Whether within one com-
munity or on a larger front, unity is essential. This includes
unity around goals, and among people and groups wanting
change. This goes hand-in-hand with shared ownership, the
sense that everyone is part of the struggle and can play a role
in it. Both unity and ownership can be strategically cultivated.
Civic campaigns and movements link corruption to widely-
held concerns, such as state capture to grievances and tangi-
ble injustices that impact people's daily lives, including basic
human security, poverty, lack of medical care, access to water,
etc. Information itself, in the form of budgets, spending, and
power holders' assets, is a source of power when accompa-
nied by civil resistance to demand accountability and change,
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as was the case in Kenya.
Creativity is a hallmark of effective mobilization, tacti-
cal development, and communication. Effective tactics can
derive from local circumstances and reflect local culture.
Consequently, while a particular tactic may not necessarily be
transferable across situations, the strategic considerations and
impact can be emulated. For example, low-risk mass actions
can activate people power even under conditions of intimida-
tion and public resignation, and once enacted, can embolden
citizens to further action. In Turkey, it began with coordinated
switching off of lights, soon augmented by unanticipated out-
pourings on the street. In the digital age, joining a Facebook
group and uploading SMS ringtones in Indonesia had a similar
function, and led to further dissent.
Communications are strategically important to build aware-
ness, win support and actively involve citizens. Depending on
the audiences and objectives of the messaging, the medium of
communicating can be the media itself, from songs to street
theater. Though not often considered part of the nonviolent
tactical repertoire, education, training and youth recreation can
be vital to build campaign capacity, confidence and resilience.
Tactical innovation, such as turning everyday actions into acts
of resistance, can thus be crucial to build support, overcome
repression, human rights abuses, and maintain campaign re-
silience. An honest image is critical for winning support. The
association of groups and individuals who are seen as incor-
ruptible can have a galvanizing effect.
As in other nonviolent struggles, in disrupting systems
of graft and the corruption-violence link, power comes from
numbers-locally, nationally, and even internationally, in the
case of Guatemala, when citizens confront endemic corruption
involving national and cross-border relationships and actors.
Power is indeed not monolithic; allies and support can be
won from within corrupt systems and individual institutions,
which can yield information, access and strategic negotiations,
especially when backed by citizen mobilization.
Conclusion
An examination of the corruption-violence nexus presents
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a bleak picture of human anguish. In spite of difficult circum-
stances, or perhaps because of them, citizens are mobilizing,
engaging in civil resistance and wielding people power to curb
corruption and injustice, in some cases weakening linkages
with violence. They exemplify the capacity of civil resistance
to potentially prevent some forms of violent conflict, foster
conflict transformation, and strengthen post-conflict peace
building. As importantly, the achievements of citizen cam-
paigns and movements fighting graft and abuse plant seeds of
hope-hope that those living under oppression have options
beyond quietly suffering or resorting to violence.
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